As the hedge fund industry has grown over the last decade, alpha has become more elusive. This paper examines several properties of the U.S. small-cap equity market and identifies a number of structural inefficiencies that may be exploited to generate alpha.
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What is it that has helped small-cap managers preserve their edge and why has it occurred? It has been widely-accepted that the small-cap equity space provides a more attractive opportunity set for alpha generation through investments in "under the radar" stocks identified by talented stock pickers. We believe managers who focus on small and mid-cap equities can benefit from the "structural alpha" that exists in this space by exploiting inefficiencies, such as the limited volume and quality of information (e.g., fewer analysts, less frequent publication of research reports, and significant dispersion for earnings estimates) and from a less crowded playing field when compared to that of large caps. To support our hypothesis, we have developed a robust data set that examines the structural characteristics of the equity universe across various market capitalizations.
2. HFR Global Hedge Fund Industry Report -First Quarter 2015.
3. The alpha estimation methodology is explained in detail in Appendix 1. 4. Alpha has been more resilient, however, for niche strategies with higher barriers to entry such as Distressed Credit and Event. 
Trading Volumes Have Declined
First, we consider how trading volumes have evolved over the last ten years for stocks included in the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000, the two main indices that track large and small-cap companies, respectively. We obtained the total monthly trading volume for each stock within both indices and divided this number by the stock's free float. We used this normalized measure of trading volume to compute an average monthly number across the constituents of each index. We plotted these monthly averages from January 2006 to February 2015 in Figure 3 , which shows a significant downward trend for both indices, indicating decreasing trading volumes. The decline for small caps, however, is much more pronounced -from 27% in 2006 to 10% in early 2015, ignoring spikes -while large-cap volume has shrunk from 21% to 16%, half of the rate for small caps. We surmise that as overall trading volume and turnover lessened during the last 10 years, the income that investment banks derived from these activities has also shrunk. The result is that banks have concentrated their analytical resources on the more profitable segment of the market capitalization spectrum, leaving small-cap equities materially under-covered by sell-side analysts. In this section, we examine various aspects of sell-side coverage for small and large-cap equities. We focus on the number of analysts covering each stock, the number of analyst publications per stock over a given period and the dispersion of analyst forecasts as indicators of consensus or quality of information. These three points lead us to the same conclusion. Small-cap equities are materially under-covered, when compared to large-cap stocks.
The Number of Analysts Covering Small-Cap Equities Is Significantly Smaller than for Large-Cap
We begin by comparing the number of analysts covering stocks in the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 indices. The S&P 500 includes the 500 largest companies with common stock listed on the NYSE or the NASDAQ. As of April 2, 2015, the capitalization of companies in the S&P 500 ranged from $2.8bn to $730bn, with a median of $19bn and an average market cap of $39bn.
The Russell 2000 index includes the smallest 2,000 of the 3,000 largest U.S.
companies. As of April 2, 2015, the market cap of stocks in the Russell 2000 ranged from $5mm to $16bn with a median of $755mm and an average market cap of $1bn. We used Bloomberg data to count the number of sell-side analysts following each stock in the corresponding index, as shown in Table 1 . The median count of analysts covering S&P 500 stocks was twenty-three, versus seven for Russell 2000 stocks. Some stocks in the Russell 2000, such as Loral Space & Communications (LORL), had no sell-side coverage at all. In contrast, Apple (AAPL), the most widely covered stock in the S&P 500, was followed by 58 analysts. This is nearly twice as many as the number of analysts that cover the most widely covered stock in the Russell 2000, American Eagle Outfitters (AEO), which was covered by 31 analysts. Source: Investcorp, range, e.g., the distance between the 25th and 75 percentiles) less than the 25th percentile or 1.5x IQR greater than the 75th percentile h For clarity, outliers with values that are 1.5x IQR (interquartile range, e.g., the distance between the 25th and 75 percentiles) less than the 25th percentile or 1.5x IQR greater
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established that fewer analysts tend to cover smaller often do they review or publish
To answer this question, we used the data service the 10 largest and 10 smallest over the previous 30 days, three . We used a broad definition of publications, research reports, research notes, earnings estimates, fixed overview articles as they relate to the company, initiation of coverage memos, financial models, rating change notices and For clarity, outliers with values that are 1.5x IQR (interquartile range, e.g., the distance between the 25th and 75 percentiles) less than the 25th percentile or 1.5x IQR greater
To answer this question, we used the data service the 10 largest and 10 smallest over the previous 30 days, three . We used a broad definition of publications, research reports, research notes, earnings estimates, fixed overview articles as they relate to the company, initiation of coverage memos, financial models, rating change notices and . We used a broad definition of publications, research reports, research notes, earnings estimates, fixedoverview articles as they relate to the company, initiation of coverage memos, financial models, rating change notices and members of the two On average, there were 36 updates for a large S&P 500 stock day Large Cap period prior to our study. 5 This ratio stayed within a 4 to 1 range for the prior three, six, and twelve-month periods. When we compare coverage of the largest 10 stocks in the S&P 500 versus the smallest 10 stocks in the Russell 2000, the ratio jumps to ~7 to 1 across periods. While Russell 2000 stocks may receive initial coverage, fewer updates are published. We believe that this relative lack of information accounts for a portion of the inefficiency that persists in the small-cap equity market. We also believe that this persistent inefficiency creates more uncertainty around earnings estimates and pricing for these companies and, hence, more opportunities for talented stock-pickers to generate alpha. This leads us to our next section, which examines return on opportunities. We sort the universe by that measure and We sort the universe by that measure and 
Majority of Event Activity Occurs in Small and Mid-Caps
While less information is available for small-cap stocks and fewer institutional investors allocate to this subset, it appears that much more event activity occurs in this universe (e.g., small-cap companies are more likely to merge or become acquired). We used Capital IQ data to analyze merger activity across small-cap (< $1bn), mid-cap ($1bn-$5bn) and large-cap (>$5bn) equities in the U.S. since 2009, and show the results in Figure 7 . Not surprisingly, over 90% of U.S. merger deals have occurred in stocks with market caps less than $5bn.
Elevated levels of corporate activity tend to drive misunderstanding and mispricing in public markets (e.g., companies undergoing corporate change may engender complex situations), and when combined with the generally reduced informational flow for small caps, may lead to opportunities to extract an analytical advantage. Furthermore, the higher incidence of catalysts in this space (evidenced by the high transaction count) can allow this potential analytical edge to be exploited to a greater degree. If an investor had the luxury of applying this strategy on earnings revisions for small caps, he or she would have earned +64.6% of excess return compared to +34.7% by following the same methodology for large caps. Part of this difference can be attributed to the higher volatility of small-cap equities; however, the results strongly indicate how much less efficient the small-cap equity market appears to be. We view quality fundamental research as a middle ground between perfect foresight and no insight. In an environment with limited coverage of small caps, investment managers who can conduct quality research may be able to generate higher returns by investing in small-cap equities instead of their large-cap counterparts. Relative to large-cap, smaller-cap equity is covered by few analysts.
Additionally, fewer publications feature small-cap stocks and a higher dispersion of earnings estimates exists for these companies. The largest hedge funds, particularly in the event driven space, gravitate to large-cap stocks; yet, most mergers and acquisitions occur in small and mid-cap companies (less than $5 billion of market capitalization). Finally, returns for "getting it right" are substantially greater for small-cap equities than for large caps.
As of result of these structural inefficiencies, we believe that alpha-focused investors can be rewarded by allocating to U.S. small-cap long/short equity strategies.
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